Individual opportunity costs are the most cited causal link between climate shocks and violent intergroup conflict outcomes (Miguel et al., 2004; Daniel Hidalgo et al., 2010; Fjelde and von Uexkull, 2012; Maystadt and Ecker, 2014; O'Loughlin et al., 2014; Harari and La Ferrara, 2014; Salehyan and Hendrix, 2014; Burke et al., 2015) . However, to date, none have made empirical estimates of the effect size at the individual level. Are the same individuals who experience economic losses due to climate shocks more likely to participate in political violence than if they had not experienced such losses? Miguel et al. (2004) instrumented growth in GDP/capita using growth in annual rainfall, and theorized that the interpretation of this variable could affect both opportunity cost (individual motivation) and state capacity (group opportunity) mechanisms (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) . The first theory suggests that the individuals who experience economic losses will be more motivated to join violent groups than if they had not experienced such losses. The second theory argues that aggregate losses will make states less able to prevent violent groups from mobilizing and take action. The individuals who experience direct losses from climate exposure in this theory are not necessarily implicated in the violence. The presence of this alternative theory that does not hypothesize an individual level effect, makes it reasonable to ask whether individually endured economic losses from climate shocks translate into increased motivation to participate in politically motivated violence.
Although many other studies have investigated individual level motivations for participation in conflict (see e.g. Verwimp, 2005; Oyefusi, 2008; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008; McDoom, 2013; Claassen, 2014; Blair et al., 2013 ), very few have tested whether marginal changes at the individual level affect the likelihood of participation (Blattman and Annan, 2016) , and none have done this in the context of climate shocks or outside of country-specific contexts. This article offers an instrumental variables approach, based on survey data and local measurements of drought, to obtain variation in and isolate motivational aspects of participation in violent conflict. It finds that some drought specifications had both a strong effect on reported changes in living conditions in Africa in two Afrobarometer survey rounds, and a substantial and statistical significant complier average causal effect of reported changes in living conditions on the likelihood of reported participation in political violence.
Individual motivational theories are not necessarily the most obvious explanation for why a given conflict happened, but they do matter for thinking about whether policy interventions aimed at affecting individual motivation structures, such as demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration programs (Blattman and Annan, 2016 ), Collier and Hoeffler (2004) compare an explanation of rebellion with the investigation of a murder: both require an exploration of motive and opportunity. Both earlier and more recent research have pointed out how information problems (Fearon, 1995) , commitment problems (Walter, 2009) , coercion (Andvig and Gates, 2010; Eck, 2014) and the dynamics of conflict (Kalyvas, 2006; Wood, 2008a,b; Staniland, 2014) constrain and challenge the notion of conflicts and participation in violence as the result of calculated plans. Yet, the intentional model of conflict is central in our understanding of violent conflicts.
Individual and collective theories of conflict
The distinction that Collier and Hoeffler (2004) makes between "greed" (or feasibility) and "grievance" is not a distinction between motive and opportunity, however. At the individual level, both "greed" and "grievances" describe motivations. At the group level, such motivations can become opportunities. Without specifying the level of analysis, motives and opportunities can be difficult to differentiate. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) mainly think of opportunity costs (the "greed" mechanism) as something modulating the rebel group opportunities for recruitment, as in the case of sudden inflows of cash or the opportunity to do a heist. For instance, they write that "the incidence of rebellion is not explained by motive, but by the atypical circumstances that generate profitable opportunities" (p. 564).
Although opportunity costs can be viewed as a group-level opportunity factor, it is more proper to think of opportunity costs as primarily modulating the individual level motivation for participation. The reason for this is that there are individual level opportunity factors that can affect individual participation; such individual opportunity factors also affect rebel group opportunities, possibly negating the effect of increased individual motivations on recruitment. Rebel groups can, for instance, be under pressure from counter-insurgency measures, which force rebel groups to recruit only those they can trust. It can be costly and time-consuming to recruit under this trust dilemma (Hegghammer, 2013) . When a violent organization can operate without significant opposition, membership can be a privilege (Le Billon, 2003; North et al., 2009; Wood, 2010) . In neither of these instances, i.e., when rebel supply is abundant, is it necessarily the case that the opportunities for rebel organizations improve when opportunity costs fall. In Table 1, I have made an non-exhaustive list that indicates how aspects discussed in conflict theories might fit into a two-by-two table of motivation and opportunity at the individual and group level.
When Collier and Hoeffler (2004) connected opportunity costs with "greed", they also tied the opportunity-cost theory to material gains. However, opportunity costs can also be non-pecuniary. Eriksen and Heier (2009, p. 67) argue, for instance, that a reason for the reduced intensity of fighting in Afghanistan during winter is that " [locals] are sitting around their stoves and they try to live as comfortable as possible". The alternative cost to fighting in the cold of winter is, among other things, to be inside where it is warm and comfortable. The opportunity-cost theory is a smaller part of a more general utility framework for thinking about individual motivations for actions. Anything that increases the utility of continuing to do something at the expensepecuniary or otherwise -of other activities increases opportunity costs.
Not all individual wishes or grievances motivate individual action. For instance, although someone may want a change in government, that person's individual participation might only change marginally the likelihood that this wish will be realized, at the expense of a risk of apprehension given your participation (Olson, 1971) . Rational actors can, therefore, find themselves in situations where they would like a change that require some people to participate, but they do not see the benefit of participating themselves. This is what Olson (1971) calls the collective action problem; his solution was somehow to provide selective incentives -that is, incentives conditional on participation. Subsequent studies have shown how a wide range of pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits can be given, and are given, by violent organizations (Grossman, 1991; Lichbach, 1995; Gates, 2002; Weinstein, 2006) or arise from the social dynamics of political strife and conflict (Petersen, 2002; Wood, 2003a,b) . This article relies on the theory that individual preferences and motivations are determined by a broader set of deliberations than pecuniary opportunity costs, but offers, at the same time, a simple and stylized model of human agency (Blattman and Annan, 2016) .
As Miguel et al. (2004) argue, climate shocks can be seen to affect the likelihood of conflict by affecting individual opportunity costs, as well as by affecting the relative capacity and opportunities of violent groups. Group-level explanations are therefore an alternative or supplement to understanding the results between climate variability and violent conflict outcomes at the aggregate level.
Indeed, the contemporary literature on resource scarcity and violent conflict emphasizes structural conditions. Fjelde and von Uexkull (2012) , for instance, find that the effect of climate variability on the likelihood of communal conflict events is higher for politically excluded groups than for included groups, whereas the effect is similar in impoverished areas and richer areas (see also Von Uexkull et al. (2016) ). They argue that politically excluded groups have fewer strategies available to them when exposed to increased resource scarcities, and therefore end up taking violent action more often.
Lack of state capacity and income are said not only to affect coercive capacities, but also capacities to provide the population with important services (Fjelde and De Soysa, 2009 ). Low state capacity and corruption also play important roles in non-state (communal) conflicts, which is the conflict type in which climate variability effects are found to be the strongest (Fjelde and von Uexkull, 2012; Elfversson, 2015; Rudolfsen, 2017) . Benjaminsen and Ba (2009) and Benjaminsen et al. (2012) document how political vacuums, poorly executed or biased government policies, and rent-seeking/corruption among government officials form the core of farmer-herder conflicts in the Sahel, conflicts which are commonly portrayed as due to droughts and changes in opportunity costs. Similarly, Sneyd et al. (2013) show that, whereas international media portrayed poverty and hunger as the factors which linked the 2008 food price rises and riots, local media discussed a more complex set of factors linked, in particular, to citizen dissatisfaction and lack of access to power. Studies which survey who fights can give some indication of opportunity and motivation patterns at both individual and group level. Verwimp (2005) traced households that were part of a survey before the Rwandan genocide to analyze the background characteristics of perpetrators in comparison with other characterizations such as innocent, victim, thief, and protector. He found that men who earned a high percentage of income from off-farm activities and who rented land for cultivation were more likely to be perpetrators (p. 317). These men were not working the poorest soils and they did not have lower than average marginal labor productivity, however. Rather, Verwimp (2005, p. 319) argues that the group of quasi-landless could expect to gain from participation -"perpetrators were very interested in the property of the murdered Tutsi."
Social networks also played an important role in deciding who would be perpetrators and who would not, according to another survey of Rwanda, this one by McDoom (2013) . Perpetrators and non-perpetrators lived in clusters, McDoom argues. "Participation then may be as much the product of social interaction as of individual agency" (p. 453).
Christopher Claassen's survey of residents in Alexandra, South Africa also seems to show that social interactions and group-level dynamics play a role in who fights (Claassen, 2014) . He found that participants in communal riots in the township were 34 years old on average, "more likely to support an opposition party, attend community policing meetings and have a high-school education" (p. 1). Blair et al. (2013) did not survey participants, but rather the support for militants among the urban population in Pakistan. They found that the poor, urban Pakistanis disliked the militants more than did the middle-class. A likely explanation for this, they argue, is that the urban poor are more exposed to the externalities of militant violence than other groups.
Oyefusi (2008) did a non-representative survey of 1337 individuals in the Niger Delta in Nigeria to explain participation in rebel violence there. He found large, significant partial correlations for questions that, he argues, tapped into both "greed" and "grievance" motivations, as well as feasibility. However, interpretation becomes difficult, as the variables in the regression are not independent of each other, and the same variable can measure different types of motivations. Oyefusi's conclusion is that group-level grievances cannot, by themselves, explain participation, and that both individual-level factors such as income and educational attainment, and communal level factors that create opportunities for illicit profit, also need to be addressed. Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) surveyed post-combatants in the civil war in Sierra Leone, dividing their rationales for participation into three categories: grievances, expectation of selective incentives for participation, and social cohesion. They found that all these factors were salient in explaining participation. The study is unique in that it managed to separate abductees from volunteers. However, the control approach that was applied to test individual causal effects leaves much to be desired, as many of the variables of interest can hardly be said to be independent of each other.
All of the above studies show that a simple expectation that those who have less are more likely to fight does not find support in empirical data. Social dynamics, networks and group-level phenomena structure the behavior of individuals, who, themselves, are capable of individual deliberation about their own situation now and in the future, as well as about whether violence is to their gain or detriment. These studies do not tell us, however, whether a marginal change in incomes, brought about by a climate shock, can increase the likelihood of participation in political violence.
A study with an arguably more convincing causal design is Blattman and Annan (2016) . Using a randomized field experiment, they evaluated a program aimed at drawing Liberian ex-fighters out of illicit work and into agriculture. They found that giving these high risk individuals both training in agriculture and initial capital inputs reduced the number of hours they were involved in illicit activities and increased the hours they engaged in farm labor. The study is a direct test of whether pecuniary incentives affect individual motivations for participating in illicit activities. They note, however, that "[a]rmed social networks, ethnic solidarity, and grievances undoubtedly influenced men's interest in mercenary work. And these drivers may have played an even larger role in a less opportunistic conflict than the Ivorian one" (p. 16). For climate-conflict studies, in which mechanisms going through changes to individual motivations are commonly posited, it is particularly relevant to test the size of this effect in a sample larger than that used by Blattman and Annan.
Qualitative studies of motivational aspects in climate-related conflicts create the expectation that individual-level motivations should have a noticeable effect on participation. One example is the studies of the Turkana-Pokot conflict in north-western Kenya, where violent livestock raiding is an integrated part of the economy, and where a tit-fortat strategy gone wrong has been employed for as long participants can remember (McCabe, 2004; Eaton, 2008; Schilling et al., 2012; Linke et al., 2015) . From focus group interviews in north-western Kenya, Schilling et al. (2012) found that accumulation of wealth, poverty, hunger, and payments of dowry were mentioned as important motivations.
Theoretical expectations
This article closely follows the formal model laid out in Blattman and Annan (2016, p. 7), which they describe as a "classic occupational choice of crime model, except with home production and the potential for (dis)utility over illicit labor". The only difference is that this article assumes different models for an urban worker and a rural worker. The formal model is used because it provides an elegant and concise description of an individual-level intentional-actor model that is sufficient for creating the expectations that are tested in this article.
The model for rural workers assume that they can allocate their time between legal agricultural production L a , illicit wage labor L v and leisure l. The gain from agriculture follows a classic production function and a price p t for those outputs, where output is a function of productivity θ, labor L t a and capital inputs
t t a t 1 . Agricultural labor is assumed to give diminishing returns to output.
The expected gain from illicit wage labor is a function of the wage w t v , labor input L t v , and a risk of future punishment. Blattman and Annan assume here that the punishment f and probability of arrest ρ is linear to the illicit labor input in the last period. The total expected earning in the rural case is therefore
In the urban case, the worker has the choice among leisure, legal wage labor L l and illicit wage labor. Because legal wage labor can be constrained in supply, it is assumed that there can be diminishing returns for such labor. The total expected earning is
1 . Individuals are assumed to have the utility function U c l L ( , , ) v . A person has some preferences for consumption c and leisure l, but also for doing illicit work. When σ is negative, the person gains negative utility from working illicitly. This negative utility must be balanced by the positive utility from monetary gains that can be used for consumption. The model also allows for positive σ, meaning that the person can get pleasure from participation in violent illicit activity in itself, apart from the monetary gains. σ is a way to capture non-wage motivations for participation in violence, such as feelings of "fighting the good fight", revenge, or defiance (Gates, 2002; Wood, 2003a,b) . A person's labor preferences can be thought to be affected due to the instrument through three different parameters in the rural case: that period's productivity θ t , the last period's capital inputs K t−1 , or a change for the preference of illicit labor σ t . In the urban case, labor preferences can be affected through consumption preferences c and preferences toward illicit work σ.
The climate can affect living conditions through several pathways. The most important are arguably changes in crop yields, availability of (clean) drinking water, sufficient pasture for livestock, conditions for vector-borne diseases and flood damages (Porter et al., 2014; FAO, 2016; Delpla et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2014; Thornton et al., 2015; Vicente-Serrano et al., 2010) . A simple narrative for how rural worker's preference for illicit work could increase is that agricultural productivity θ t goes down due to unfavorable climatic conditions. Assuming that market prices are not perfectly elastic to local supply, the expected gain from agricultural labor goes down. For those in the population whose gain follow the above model, it means that more time will be allocated to illicit wage labor such as participation in violent action, all else being equal.
In a given area, when the average rural worker's experience is lower agricultural productivity, there could be some who are not affected. Assuming that market prices are at least partially elastic to local supply, the expected outcome for such deviant farmers will be an increase in the expected gain from agricultural labor and less time used for illicit wage labor. However, this outcome can only be true for a minority of farmers, and should therefore not drive our expectations. This scenario is also not a given, since farmers seldom are self-sufficient when it comes to food. Depending on the level of consumption at market prices, and how different food stuffs are affected, their gain could be mitigated by increased costs. Indeed, most poor producers in sub-Saharan Africa experience a net loss of income from higher food prices (Wodon and Zaman, 2010) .
Another narrative is that rural producers lose capital inputs, or income to buy capital inputs in the previous period K t−1 . For instance, a failed crop can lead a farmer to not getting the required seeds for the next season, or a goat that was going to produce more goats next season had to be slaughtered for food or money. As in the case of reduced productivity, assuming imperfect local supply elasticity, more time will be allocated to illicit wage labor.
When economic losses affect vital consumption patterns, we should expect that the will to work to increase at the expense of leisure time. Drawing on studies of the psychology of loss and loss aversion, it could be argued that individuals may even overcompensate for the experienced loss by working more and taking less leisure time (Novemsky and Kahneman, 2005) . In the cases in which individuals compensate for losses by engaging in less leisure, it is not obvious that they would report worsened living conditions (although having less leisure time could be considered a decline in living conditions). Such adaptive behavior can therefore attenuate estimates toward zero.
In the case of urban workers, changes to their income as a direct result of changes in productivity or capital inputs due to local climate variations are not generally observed. Such variation is only observed if market prices are elastic to local supply, which could affect consumption c. A potential alternative for consumers is to switch their diet to other, possibly unaffected food-stuffs. Additionally, while farming is always suffering from diminishing returns of labor, urban workers can, in principle, simply seek more lawful work L l at the expense of leisure.
Only when there are diminishing returns to legal labor (e.g., when the only available extra work pays less) will there be a clear economic reason for switching labor from legal to illicit work. There are many ways in which σ can be affected. Some such examples are discussed below.
Experiments have shown that humans emphasize direct experience over observational data (Simonsohn et al., 2008) . Although we can know that a policy is wrong, biased, or nonexistent, we may not necessarily act on that knowledge before we ourselves are exposed to the consequences. Experiencing economic loss from environmental damages which a person knew could have been prevented through some previous intervention could, therefore, lead to increased anger or resentment, thereby increasing σ.
Technologies available today can mitigate effects of temporary extreme climatic conditions. Irrigation, drought resistant seeds, access and knowledge about fertilizer usage and meteorological forecasts are all examples of such technologies. In many cases, governments take partial responsibility for the spread of such technologies, and the lack of access to these technologies can be perceived as a form of deprivation over which grievances can arise. To the extent that violence is perceived to address these grievances, it can make individuals more favorable towards its use, thereby increasing σ.
Pastoralists and farmers can come increasingly into conflict during droughts because areas suitable for pasture shrink. In some cases, this means that pastoralists have to move their livestock to areas occupied by farmers. In such situations, both farmers and pastoralists can have reasons to be more favorable towards the use of violence. Farmers may wish for justice or revenge. Pastoralists may think that farmers have unjustly encroached on territories they need for pasture, and/or that government policies about land-use are unfair.
It is also possible to reduce σ. For instance, in bad times, people may feel the need to stick together and cooperate rather than fight over material resources. Linke et al. (2015) and Linke et al. (2015) find that respondents in communities with formal and informal institutions that provide norms of behavior during droughts were less accepting of the use of violence and endorsed ethnic community militias to a less extent during drought periods than communities that did not have such institutions.
Based on this theory, we should expect rural workers to become more willing to join illicit violent groups after experiencing economic losses from environmental damages unless the potential pecuniary utility to be gained is offset by a similar reduction in the non-pecuniary utility of participating in violent acts. We should not in general expect urban workers to change their working preferences because they are experiencing local droughts, however. First, it is not obvious that they would endure economic losses, and second, even if they do, it is not obvious that they would be more inclined to take up illicit work.
The model for this article is made for a very particular context, and it abstracts away important details. For instance, it assumes that all individuals see information about the possibility of work for violent organizations and that they are approached by these organizations. In the real world, not all will have knowledge about the possibility for such work, and many individuals have such a low σ that they do not regard such incomes as serious alternatives to lawful work. As with Blattman and Annan (2016) , this model is mainly relevant to persons at high risk of joining illicit violent groups to begin with, or who are already working for groups that are willing to use violence.
Research design
To test the theory, the article uses two survey items in Afrobarometer that tap into changes in personal living conditions (PECON) and participation in political violence (POLVIO) (Afrobarometer Data, 2016) .
2 Since respondents are asked to compare their current living conditions at the time of the survey with what they were one year previously, the core idea of the paper is to instrument reported changes in personal living conditions through exogenous events in the 12 month period before the interview, and then estimate the casual effect of the instrumented PECON variable on the likelihood of reported participation in political violence. Specifically, the article argues that a standardized precipitation-evapotranspiration index (SPEI) can act as such an instrument. Fig. 1 shows the conceptual research design of this paper. It is constructed around the time-line ending with the date of Afrobarometer interviews, and going back in time 12 months. It shows some of the choices that can be made when constructing the instrument. They will be discussed below.
The dependent variable in the study is the response to a survey question about participation in political violence (POLVIO). The exact wording of the question is: "Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past year. If not, would you do this if you had the chance: Used force or violence for a political cause." The respondent can choose between seven different answers: "No, would never do this", "No, but would do if had the chance", "Yes, once or twice", "Yes, several times", "Yes, often", "Don't know" and "Refused to answer".
The question can capture a wide range of activities. "Using force or violence" means that respondents could report non-violent uses of force, for instance non-violent protest (e.g., a Greenpeace activist chaining herself). A reasonable interpretation, however, is that the question implies illicit acts, outside of participation in a legal protest or strike. Another aspect of the question which can be interpreted in different ways is "for a political cause". A broad interpretation assumes that actions were directed against other groups, and not (only) specific individuals. But there could be a tendency to think of the government. Some respondents may interpret the question to exclude conflicts in which the state is not directly involved (e.g., conflicts between criminal gangs).
There is disagreement over whether participation in violence can be measured simply by asking people whether they have engaged in violence. Wood (2003a, p. 32) argues that survey data provide little insight into these questions. She is especially skeptical as to whether respondents would be willing to respond (truthfully) to a survey, and wonders whether an admission of violence could in fact just be a statement of desire to commit violence. On the other hand, since participating in political violence generally is illegal, admitting to such actions is to admit to a crime. If the respondent believes that there could be repercussions from admitting participation, it seems likely that he/ she would lie or refuse to answer.
Social desirability bias -which occurs when respondents anticipate the views of the enumerator and provide answers aimed at pleasing her -is a well known issue in the survey literature (p. 33). This bias is likely to be even greater when respondents are asked about sensitive issues, such as participation in illicit activities. Creatively designed surveys, that employ, for example, secret ballots or endorsement experiments when asking about sensitive issues, have been used (Lyall et al., 2013; Claassen, 2014 ). The Afrobarometer is not such a survey. Although social desirability bias can be an obvious problem, particularly when the goal is to produce representative statistics from a population, it is less problematic here. Assuming that individuals that lie will mainly refrain from telling the enumerator that they have participated in political violence, as opposed to assuming that they will mainly tell the enumerator they have participated when they have not, the bias will attenuate the estimated effect towards zero. This bias therefore only increase the risk of a Type 1 error. Any positive effects should still be interpreted as a rejection of the null hypothesis.
The failure to respond to a question (item nonresponse) can increase when questions are asked about sensitive issues (p. 34). Approximately half as many as those who reported participation answered "Don't know" or refused to answer (see Table 2 ). It can be asked whether this group should be treated as missing at random, or if participants in violence are more likely than non-participants to refuse to answer. The appendix (Section 3) to this article includes a sensitivity test whereby nonresponse items are varyingly assigned to the other two possible outcomes. Based on those results, it is likely that most refusals to answer are non-participants. Since the share of participants also is very low, such an interpretation seems warranted.
The independent variable is the respondent's evaluation of his/her living conditions now compared to twelve months earlier (PECON).
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The respondent can answer "Much worse", "Worse", "Same", "Better", "Much Better", "Don't know" or "Refused to answer".
The PECON item is open to interpretation. Individuals will focus on different things when thinking about living conditions, such as personal income, housing conditions, personal and family health, relations with neighbors, their commute, and changes in personal relations. Changes of any of these can be related to the theory outlined above. However, the climate variability instrument is unlikely to affect all types of changes in living conditions. The instrumented effect must therefore be interpreted as a Local Average Treatment Effect/Complier Average Fig. 1 . Conceptual design. The figure depicts the conceptual design in this article. The main question is which of the months -? 1 −12 in the 12 month period before the interview -should be chosen to instrument perceived changes of livelihood between t 1 and t 0 using SPEI. The SPEI interval length and timing can be varied, and it can be matched with growing seasons. A concern is that the outcome can be measured before the treatment (POLVIO BEFORE ). Causal Effect (LATE/CACE) (p. 141ff). In order to successfully identify a causal effect, IV models must involve a strong instrument which is exogenous and random, and must also meet the exclusion restriction and the stable unit value assumption (non-interference). Additionally, when heterogeneous treatment effects are assumed, monotonicity must also be assumed (Gerber and Green, 2012; Angrist and Pischke, 2008; Sovey and Green, 2011) . The following paragraphs will discuss some of these criteria. A more elaborate discussion is found in the appendix (Section 1) to this article.
An instrument must be exogenous and only affect the outcome through the mediating factor (p. 189f). One way of making sure that the instrument meets the latter criterion (assuming excludability and noninterference) is if the propensity for being exposed to a particular instrumental treatment is known and controlled for (that is, when the instrument is random) (p. 81).
SPEI is an estimate of the probability distribution of the precipitation-evapotranspiration system in a given area-month (or interval) (Vicente-Serrano et al., 2010) . The assumption in this article is that this distribution is equal for all areas. This assumption is quite reasonable when using SPEI (See Appendix, Fig. 1) . A benefit to using SPEI is that it is a function of two relatively independent variables (precipitation minus evapotranspiration). The central limit theorem says that any sum of several independent distributions tends toward a normal distribution. This is exactly what happens in SPEI. Since the underlying SPEI distributions are similar (unlike SPI or growth in rainfall), SPEI can be used as a random instrument in cross-sectional analysis.
A strong instrument is needed to prevent bias (Bound et al., 1995) . In this design, a strong instrument arises if and when variation in SPEI can explain changes in personal living conditions. Precipitation and evapotranspiration can affect living conditions through several pathways. The most important are arguably changes in crop yields, availability of (clean) drinking water, sufficient pasture for livestock, conditions for vector-borne diseases and flood damages (Porter et al., 2014; FAO, 2016; Delpla et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2014; Thornton et al., 2015; Vicente-Serrano et al., 2010) .
There are two parameters that can be manipulated in SPEI to get the strongest possible instrument. One is the timing of the end-month of SPEI in the last year before the interview. It may be thought, for instance, that droughts during the growing season will have a more substantial impact on living conditions than will droughts outside of the growing season. The other is the interval over which SPEI is calculated. If precipitation and temperature are averaged over large intervals, the average tends to pick up different underlying phenomena, such as soil dryness/flooding, reservoir levels and stream-flows (National Drought Mitigation Center, 2014). Generally, shorter intervals capture immediate soil conditions, whereas longer intervals capture stream-flow and reservoir levels.
The bottom of Fig. 1 represents the dependent variable. It points to a problem that the outcome can potentially be measured before the treatment, something which can severely threaten unbiased inference. 4 The closer to the time of the interview (t 1 ) that we instrument changes in living conditions, the longer the time that has elapsed during which a respondent could have participated in political violence. Also, a consequence of longer SPEI intervals is that longer time has gone where we do not know whether the respondent participated before or after treatment. Ideally, SPEI-1 at t 1 − 11 months should be a strong instrument, as it minimizes the time during which participation in violence could have happened before the treatment. On the other hand, there may be other interval lengths and timings that produce a stronger instrument of PECON i .
To put the research design to the test, this article estimated the same models, using only SPEI values from another time-period that could not have affected the outcome, akin to a placebo-control test. The values used are SPEI data from 20 years before Afrobarometer interviews. The expectation for such a test is that the relationship between SPEI and living conditions is near zero, as SPEI 20 years before the interview cannot affect changes in living conditions between one year before the interview and the time of the interview.
The main model specification is a recursive bivariate probit model, which allows for non-linear splines in both the first and the second stage (Marra and Radice, 2011) . It means that SPEI can be modeled as a non-linear spline effect, rather than assuming linearity or making an arbitrary binary cut. Since POLVIO and PECON has more than two response alternatives, they were collapsed into binary variables called BPOLVIO and BPECON. For BPOLVIO, those answering "Yes" (3 different answers) are coded 1, and those answering "No, would never do this" and "No, but would do if had the chance" are coded 0. Since the latter response could arguably capture motivation for violence, the models were also run using a variable whereby that response is coded as 1. For BPECON, those answering "Same", "Better" and "Much Better" are coded as 1 and "Worse" and "Much Worse" are coded as 0. Those who did not know, refused to answer, or were otherwise missing are coded as missing. See the Appendix (Section 2) for details.
Since SPEI is only argued to be random in cross-sections, the models control for which Afrobarometer round the respondent participated in. While other control variables should not be needed here, the precision of estimates can benefit from including variables that predict the two outcome variables. Three predictors are included: the respondents gender and age, as well as a random country-effect. None of these predictors are control variables. Age and SPEI are modeled as thin-plate splines, which are denoted by ts() (Wood, 2003a,b) . Country specific effects are modeled using an i.i.d. normal random effects smoother, which are denoted rs() (Wood, 2008a,b) .
When estimating standard errors, or when testing for weak instruments, since randomization happens at group-level rather than at the individual level, it is important to take this clustering into account. The assumption is that the instrument is randomized at the first level administrative unit, and the clustering is done accordingly.
Since F-statistics are not meaningful for bivariate probit models, an alternative 2SLS model is used when calculating the weak instrument tests. The 2SLS models are also not capable of estimating random smoothers and splines. 5 The model used is a best 2SLS approximation of the recursive bivariate probit model. Specifically, I estimate
Data
Afrobarometer rounds 2 and 5 were carried out in -2004 in 16 and 35 countries in Africa, respectively (Afrobarometer Data, 2004 . In most countries, the survey was done within a 3-4 week period. Afrobarometer aims at a representative study at the national level, but does stratified sampling at the district level, as well as a random sampling of primary sampling units (PSU) within each district. Within each PSU, commonly eight individuals are randomly sampled by finding a random starting point, randomly selecting households, and then randomly selecting a member of the household.
This article assume that Afrobarometer is representative in each first administrative level in all the surveyed countries. Although their sampling strategy can ensure local representativeness, the low N in each PSU and the relatively few PSUs in each administrative unit mean that the uncertainty about the true local average is quite high. Afrobarometer only promise representativeness at the country level. In the sample used, after removing observations with missing data, the minimum number of respondents in each administrative area is 8 (i.e. only one PSU), the median is 90, and the maximum number of respondents is 1473 (the Central region in Malawi). The full distribution can be seen in the Appendix (Fig. 3) .
Monthly precipitation data is taken from the GPCC v.7.0 0.5°grid resolution product (Schneider et al., 2015) ; temperature from GHCN/ CAMS, also at 0.5 ∘ grid resolution (Fan and van den Dool, 2008) . 6 After manually matching all districts in Afrobarometer with the geo-referenced polygon representation of them in GADM v.2.8 (Hijmans, 2015) , the mean precipitation, temperature and centroid latitude was calculated for each district using all grid observations that intersected with a polygon. From the time-series of mean precipitation and temperature from 1948 to 2014, SPEI was calculated for each district using the SPEI package in R (Beguería and Vicente-Serrano, 2013) . The centroid latitude of the district was used to measure sun-hours in each month, in order to estimate Potential Evapotranspiration (PET) using the Thorntwaithe method (Thornthwaite, 1948) . The result can be seen in Fig. 2 . Since only parts of Africa were surveyed in round 2 and 5, only those parts are included in the study.
To decide the final month of the growing season, the mode of all grid-cells intersecting each district of the growend variable from PRIO-GRID was used. growend is defined as the growing season for the main crop with the highest harvested area within a PRIO-GRID cell (Tollefsen et al., 2012 (Tollefsen et al., , 2016 . The original crop data is from the MIRCA 2000 dataset (Portmann et al., 2010) .
Results
The bivariate relations (Table 2) show that the vast majority of the respondents did not report participating in political violence and that more people reported having same or better living conditions than they had 12 months earlier. An naive estimate of the causal effect we are interested in would be to subtract the share who participated in violence and reported having same or better living conditions, P(Participated in [v]iolence|Same or [b] etter), from the share who participated in violence and reported a deterioration in living conditions, P(V|[W] orse):
From this naive estimate, we would assume that there is no relationship between these two variables. However, there may be confounding factors which bias the estimate toward zero, suggesting the need for an IV method. Table 3 shows the F-statistics for the models defined in Eq. (2), both for the main treatment models, and for the placebo test. The grayed cells are the only specifications which pass the weak instrument test (F > 16.38) .
The first thing to notice is that we find specifications which pass the weak instrument test only in rural areas. Since this finding is in line with the theoretical model, it should increase our confidence that SPEI is picking up the signal we want it to pick up.
The second thing to notice is that in the specifications using the endmonth of the last growing season before the interview (the column furthest to the right), SPEI does not seem to be strongly related to reported changes in living conditions. This finding should decrease our confidence that SPEI is picking up the signal we want it to. One possible explanation is that the measurement of growing season is poor. Growing seasons can vary between years, and the producers of the mode of the main crop may not be representative.
The third thing to notice is that, although the placebo test does have specifications where the F-statistic is around 7-10, and although the placebo test generally has higher F-statistics in the rural than in the urban subsample, the placebo never reaches the levels of association that we find for the actual treatment.
The strongest instrument from all the specifications came from using SPEI-3 as a linear instrument, measured at ten months before the interview. Here, the F-statistic is 30.89 which passes the weak instrument test suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005) . Since this selection comes quite early in the 12-month interval, this candidate could be a good way to circumvent the problem that the outcome could have been decided before the treatment. That specification is used in the following tests.
The estimated effect of SPEI-3 on BPECON measured at ten months before the interview, for all observations and for the urban and rural subsample, is shown in Fig. 3 . In the rural subsample, respondents more often report same or better living conditions as the climate becomes wetter and colder. In the urban subsample, however, the differences are negligible and not statistically significant. 8 Since the instrument is weak for the urban subsample, that estimate is only shown for completeness. In the rural subsample, the CACE is estimated to be −.12, meaning that a person in the complier sub-population is 12% less likely to participate in politically motivated violence if his living conditions stayed the same or became better, than if he had experienced a deterioration of his living conditions. The 95% precision interval of this simulation is [−.23, −.06].
The complier sub-population includes those whose living conditions respond to the instrument. Since we do not know the proportion of compliers in the sample, there is no simple way to get back to the ATE in the population, and thus to the societal effect of a deterioration in living conditions on participation. It does show, however, that the unknown number who are compliers are on average more likely to participate when living conditions are getting worse.
In the above tests, missing observations are treated as missing at random. It is quite likely, however, that they are not. To investigate this, the main model for the rural sample is run twice, one where all missing values are coded as having both experienced a deterioration in living conditions and participated in conflict, and one where all missing values are coded as having experienced improvements in living conditions and not participated in conflict. The first model results in a best estimate of −.18 [−.27, −.1], while the second model estimate is −.12 [−.22, −.05] (as shown in Fig. 6 in the Appendix to this article). It shows that the lower bound estimate is not that much lower as a result of missing values, but that the higher bound estimate could be higher.
Recoding "No, but would do if had the chance" from BPOLVIO = 0, to BPOLVIO = 1, dramatically affects the result. Now, the estimated effect becomes -.06 [-.25,.07 ] (See the Appendix, Fig. 5 ). One possibility is that there is an important difference between those who actually participate, and those who only say that they would have liked to do so.
Discussion
This paper is the first to quantify the causal effect of a person's experiencing a deterioration in living conditions due to droughts on that person's likelihood of participation in political violence. The results show that participation in political violence, on average, would The table shows the F-statistics comparing a base model of BPECON and a model where SPEI is included. The greyed cells are the only specifications which result in a F-statistic larger than 16.38, which is the threshold for SPEI to be regarded as a strong enough instrument to yield consistent estimates in the second stage. Fig. 3 . Non-linear effect of SPEI-3 on living conditions. increase for those among the population that comply with the instrument when living conditions goes down. This is empirical support for the notion that individual motivations affect conflict participation given the right context, and that climate variations can increase such motivations. The estimated complier average causal effect is large. That 1 out of 10 (of those whose living conditions are affected by droughts) would have participated in political violence that they would otherwise have engaged in if not for having experienced a deterioration of living conditions is potentially a massive effect. The unknown in this equation, of course, is the size of the population that are compliers.
Four points make the identification credible. First, empirical SPEI distributions are similar. This is a core assumption when arguing that SPEI can be treated as a randomized variable in cross-sectional studies. Second, the instrument is only effective in rural areas, which makes sense theoretically. Third, the instrument is not strong in the placebotest. Fourth, the first stage relationship in the strongest specification is quite good. The F-statistic is double the size of what is needed to pass the weak instrument test.
Although these results cannot be used to say that there will be more conflicts due to droughts (since structural conditions may also change), they can be used to argue that policy interventions which directly target those who have lost income or capital because of droughts can reduce the ability of violent organizations to recruit new members.
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